We could solve this with custom integrations, or we can exploit an IETF standard called SCIM (System for Cross-domain Identity Management). The beauty of SCIM is that it brings a level of standardization to the mechanics of sharing personal identity information, addressing the fact that this data goes through a life cycle.
While Oracle’s IDCS and IAM support identity management for authentication and authorization for OCI and SaaS such as HCM, SCM, and so on. Most software ecosystems need more than that. If you have personalized custom applications or COTS or non-Oracle SaaS that need more than just authentication and need some of your people’s data needs to be replicated.
The lifecycle would include:
- Creation of users.
- Users move in and out of groups as their roles and responsibilities change.
- User details change, reflecting life events such as changing names.
- Users leave as they’re no longer employees, deleted their account for the service, or exercise their right to be forgotten.
It means any SCIM-compliant application can be connected to IDCS or IAM, and they’ll receive the relevant changes. Not only does it standardize the process of integrating it helps handle compliance needs such as ensuring data is correct in other applications, that data is not retained any longer than is needed (removal in IDCS can trigger the removal elsewhere through the SCIM interface). In effect we have the opportunity to achieve master data management around PII.
SCIM works through the use of standardized RESTful APIs. The payloads have a standardized set of definitions which allows for customized extension as well. The customization is a lot like how LDAP can accommodate additional data.
The value of SCIM is such that there are independent service providers who support and aid the configuration and management of SCIM to enable other applications.
Securing such data flows
As this is flowing data that is by its nature very sensitive, we need to maximize security. Risks that we should consider:
- Malicious intent that results in the introduction of a fake SCIM client to egress data
- Use of the SCIM interface to ingress the poisoning of data (use of SCIM means that poisoned data could then propagate to all the identity-connected systems).
- Identity hijacking – manipulating an identity to gain further access.
There are several things that can be done to help secure the SCIM interfaces. This can include the use of an API Gateway to validate details such as the identity of the client and where the request originated from. We can look at the payload and validate it against the SCIM schema using an OCI Function.
We can block the use of operations by preventing the use of certain HTTP verbs and/or URLs for particular or all origins.
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