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Tag Archives: Owasp

Relationship between CVEs, CVSS, CWE and lots of other TLAs starting with C

07 Friday Aug 2026

Posted by mp3monster in development, General, Security, Technology

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Tags

CVE, CVSS, CWE, cyber, MITRE, NIST, Owasp, Security, standards

A lot of developers are focused on CVEs, as we need to know does the library, language or other building block I use to create a solution have an identified vulnerability that needs mitigating? We probably also pay attention to OWASP (Open Worldwide Application Security Project). But CVEs and OWASP aren’t the beginning and end of the story. This a larger ecosystem of standards involved.

CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) is of particular interest if you get a chance to step back from fire fighting CVEs. This is interesting because, rather than addressing individually identified vulnerabilities, like the OWASP Top 10s, it looks at a classifies the vulnerabilities. When you get down the Base and Variant categories we’re into specific details. This is helpful, as classifying our CVEs against CWE can tell us the technical domains where the maximum effort can return the greatest level of mitigation/remediation of CVEs (be that creating a patch or defining a mitigation strategy).

I was going to sketch out the relationships between the key standards, but realized an LLM can do a better job, so here is a visual summary:

With so many TLAs in the diagram, here is a quick reference pulled together (including from my own library of handy links).

Acronym / referenceExpanded formOfficial HTTP linkOne-sentence summaryAuthority / allocation relevance
CVECommon Vulnerabilities and Exposurescve.org/about/overviewCVE provides globally recognised identifiers and records for publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities. (cve.org)CVE IDs are assigned by authorised CNAs or by MITRE/CVE Program structures.
CNACVE Numbering Authoritycve.org/partnerinformation/listofpartnersCNAs are authorised organisations that assign CVE IDs and publish CVE Records within an agreed scope. (cve.org)Primary delegated authorities for allocating CVE IDs.
CNA-LRCNA of Last Resortcve.org/ProgramOrganization/StructureA CNA-LR supports CVE assignment when no more specific CNA is available for a vulnerability. (cve.org)Fallback route for CVE ID allocation.
MITREThe MITRE Corporationmitre.org/focus-areas/cybersecurity/capabilities-resourcesMITRE is closely associated with CVE, CWE, CAPEC and ATT&CK as a maintainer, operator or steward of major cybersecurity knowledge bases. (MITRE)Current CVE Program Secretariat and maintainer of CWE/CAPEC resources.
CWECommon Weakness Enumerationcwe.mitre.orgCWE is a community-developed catalogue of software and hardware weakness types that can lead to vulnerabilities. (Common Weakness Enumeration)CWE IDs are maintained by MITRE; they classify weakness types, not individual vulnerabilities.
CWSSCommon Weakness Scoring Systemcwe.mitre.org/cwssCWSS is a CWE-related scoring method for prioritising software weaknesses, but the older version referenced by MITRE is marked obsolete. (Common Weakness Enumeration)Scores weaknesses, not CVE vulnerabilities; largely secondary compared with CVSS in current vulnerability workflows.
CVSS v4.0Common Vulnerability Scoring System version 4.0first.org/cvss/v4.0CVSS v4.0 is the current major CVSS standard family used to express vulnerability severity with base, threat, environmental and supplemental metrics. (FIRST Forum) (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams)Maintained by FIRST; it scores vulnerabilities but does not allocate vulnerability IDs.
Defines the scoring structure/ranking scale, not ID allocation.
NISTNational Institute of Standards and Technologynist.govNIST hosts and maintains important security automation resources including NVD and CPE-related specifications. (NVD)Maintains NVD and official CPE dictionary infrastructure.
NVDNational Vulnerability Databasenvd.nist.govNVD enriches CVE records with structured metadata such as affected platforms, weakness classifications, references and severity scores.Enrichment database, not the allocator of CVE IDs.
CPECommon Platform Enumerationnvd.nist.gov/Products/CPECPE provides standardised names for identifying affected products, platforms and software configurations. (NVD)Supports product/platform matching in NVD and vulnerability scanners.
CAPECCommon Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classificationcapec.mitre.orgCAPEC is a MITRE-maintained catalogue of attack patterns used to understand how weaknesses may be exploited. (CAPEC)CAPEC entries relate to CWEs and help connect weaknesses to attack behaviour.
CSAFCommon Security Advisory Frameworkoasis-open.org/committees/csafCSAF is an OASIS standard for creating and exchanging structured machine-readable security advisories. (OASIS)Advisory exchange format that can carry CVE, product status, remediation and scoring data.
VEXVulnerability Exploitability eXchangecisa.gov SBOM resourcesVEX communicates whether a known vulnerability is exploitable in a specific product or deployment context. (CISA)Helps qualify CVE findings so consumers can distinguish exploitable from non-exploitable exposure.
CISACybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agencycisa.govCISA publishes operational vulnerability guidance and maintains the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue. (CISA)Maintains KEV and participates in the wider CVE/vulnerability ecosystem.
KEVKnown Exploited Vulnerabilities cataloguecisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalogKEV is CISA’s authoritative catalogue of vulnerabilities known to have been exploited in the wild. (CISA)Prioritisation signal based on observed exploitation, not severity alone.
EPSSExploit Prediction Scoring Systemfirst.org/epssEPSS estimates the probability that a published CVE will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. (FIRST Forum)Probability-based prioritisation signal that complements CVSS and KEV.
CERT/CCCERT Coordination Centerkb.cert.org/vulsCERT/CC coordinates vulnerability disclosure and publishes Vulnerability Notes. (CERT Coordination Center)Can act as a coordinator in disclosure workflows and may interact with CNA/CVE processes.
CVDCoordinated Vulnerability DisclosureCERT Guide to CVDCVD is the process of coordinating information among finders, vendors and other stakeholders before public disclosure and mitigation communication. (CERT Coordination Center)Process framework around disclosure; not itself an ID system.
SBOMSoftware Bill of Materialsntia.gov/software-bill-materialsAn SBOM describes the software components that make up a product so downstream users can reason about exposure and supply-chain risk. (NTIA)Often paired with VEX and vulnerability feeds to assess affected components.
CycloneDXCycloneDX Bill of Materials standardcyclonedx.orgCycloneDX is an OWASP full-stack Bill of Materials standard for supply-chain and cyber-risk use cases. (CycloneDX)SBOM/VEX-capable format used in vulnerability management pipelines.
SPDXSoftware Package Data Exchangespdx.devSPDX is an open standard, ISO/IEC 5962:2021, for representing SBOMs and other software supply-chain metadata. (SPDX)SBOM format often used alongside vulnerability data sources.
SWIDSoftware Identification tagNIST SWID guidanceSWID tags are ISO/IEC 19770-2 software identification files that can support software asset, patch and vulnerability management. (NIST Computer Security Resource Center)Product identification standard related to CPE-style inventory matching.
SSVCStakeholder-Specific Vulnerability CategorizationCMU SEI SSVC v2.0SSVC uses decision trees to prioritise vulnerability response actions for specific stakeholder contexts. (SEI)Prioritisation model that complements CVSS, KEV and EPSS.
MITRE ATT&CKAdversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledgeattack.mitre.orgMITRE ATT&CK is a knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques and procedures based on real-world observations. (MITRE ATT&CK)Related attack-behaviour framework that can be connected to CAPEC/CWE/CVE analysis.
OWASP Top 10Open Worldwide Application Security Project Top 10owasp.org/Top10The OWASP Top 10 is a standard awareness document for developers and web application security risks. (OWASP Foundation)Useful application-security reference that often maps conceptually to CWEs.
OSVOpen Source Vulnerabilities / OSV schemaosv.devOSV provides a machine-readable vulnerability format and database that maps open-source vulnerabilities precisely to package versions or commit hashes. (OSV)Adjacent vulnerability-data ecosystem, especially useful for open-source dependency scanning.

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Oracle API CS vs OCI API approach to securing gateway configuration

02 Tuesday Jun 2020

Posted by mp3monster in API Platform CS, APIs & microservices, General, Technology

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API, Cloud Native, IaaS, Linux Foundation, OCI, Oracle, Owasp, PaaS, SaaS, Security, Terraform

A couple of years ago I got to discuss some of the design ideas behind API Platform Cloud Service. One of the points we discussed was how API Platform CS kept the configuration of APIs entirely within the platform, which meant some version management tasks couldn’t be applied like any other code. Whilst we’ve solved that problem (and you can see the various tools for this here API Platform CS tools). The argument made that your API policies are pretty important, if they get into the public domain then people can better understand to go about attacking your APIs and possibly infer more.

Move on a couple of years, Oracle’s 2nd generation cloud is established an maturing rapidly (OCI) and the organisational changes within Oracle mean PaaS was aligned to SaaS (Oracle Integration Cloud, Visual Builder CS as examples) or more cloud native IaaS. The gateway which had a strong foot in both camps eventually became aligned to IaaS (note that this doesn’t mean that the latest evolution of the API platform (Oracle Infrastructure API) will lose its cloud agnostic capabilities, as this is one of unique values of the solution, but over time the underpinnings can be expected to evolve).

Any service that has elements of infrastructure associated with it has been mandated to use Terraform as the foundation for definition and configuration. The Terraform mandate is good, we have some consistency across products with something that is becoming a defacto standard. However, by adopting the Terraform approach does mean all of our API configurations are held outside the product, raising the security risk of policy configuration is not hidden away, but conversely configuration management is a lot easier.

This has had me wondering for a long time, with the use of Terraform how do we mitigate the risks that API CS’s approach was trying to secure? But ultimately the fundamental question of security vs standardisation.

Mitigation’s

Any security expert will tell you the best security is layered, so if one layer is found to be vulnerable, then as long as the next layer is different then you’re not immediately compromised.

What this tells us is, we should look for ways to mitigate or create additional layers of security to protect the security of the API configuration. These principles probably need to extend to all Terraform files, after all it not only identifies security of not just OCI API, but also WAF, networks that are public and how they connect to private subnets (this isn’t an issue unique to Oracle, its equally true for AWS and Azure). Some mitigation actions worth considering:

  • Consider using a repository that can’t be accidentally exposed to the net – configuration errors is the OWASP Top 10. So let’s avoid the mistake if possible. If this isn’t an option, then consider how to mitigate, for example …
    • Strong restrictions on who can set or change visibility/access to the repo
    • Configure a simple regular check that looks to see if your repos have been accidentally made publicly visible. The more frequent the the check the smaller the potential exposure window
  • Make sure the Terraform configurations doesn’t contain any hard coded credentials, there are tools that can help spot this kind of error, so use them. Tools exist to allow for the scanning of such errors.
  • Think about access control to the repository. It is well known that a lot of security breaches start within an organisation.
  • Terraform supports the ability to segment up and inject configuration elements, using this will allow you to reuse configuration pieces, but could also be used to minimize the impact of a breach.
  • Of course he odds are you’re going to integrate the Terraform into a CI/CD pipeline at some stage, so make sure credentials into the Terraform repo are also secure, otherwise you’ve undone your previous security steps.
  • Minimize breach windows through credentials tokens and certificate hanging. If you use Let’s Encrypt (automated certificate issuing solution supported by the Linux Foundation). Then 90 day certificates isn’t new.

Paranoid?

This may sound a touch paranoid, but as the joke goes….

Just because I’m paranoid, it doesn’t mean they’re not out to get me

Fundamental Security vs Standardisation?

As it goes the standardisation is actually a dimension of security. (This article illustrates the point and you can find many more). The premise is, what can be ensured as the most secure environment, one that is consistent using standards (defacto or formal) or one that is non standard and hard to understand?

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Security Vulnerabilities in Solution Deployment

04 Saturday Jan 2020

Posted by mp3monster in development, General, Technology

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CNCF, deployment, Oracle, Owasp, Security, software, TUF, update framework, updating

To varying degrees, most techies are aware of the security vulnerabilities identified in the OWASP Top 10 (SQL Injection, trying to homebrew Identity management etc), although I still sometimes have conversations where I feel the need to get the yellow or red card out. But the bottom line is that these risks are perhaps more appreciated because it is easier to understand external entities attacking seeking direct attacks to disrupt or access information. But there are often subtler and at least more costly to repair attacks such as internal attacks and indirect attacks such as compromising software deployment mechanisms.

This, later attack Is not a new risk, as you can see from the following links, been recognised by the security community for some time (you can find academic papers going back 10+ years looking at the security risks for Yum and RPM for example).

  • Survivable Key Compromise in Software Update Systems
  • Consequences of Insecure Software Updates
  • Attacks on Package Manager
  • The Problem of Package Manager Trust

But software is becoming ever more pervasive, we’re more aware than ever that maintaining software to the latest releases means that known vulnerabilities are closed. As a result, we have seen a proliferation in mechanisms to recognise the need to update and deploying updates. 10 years ago, updating frameworks where typically small in number and linked to vendors who could/had to invest in making the mechanisms as a secure as possible – think Microsoft, Red Hat. However we have seen this proliferate, any browser worthy of attention has automated updating let alone the wider software tools. As development has become more polyglot every language has its central repos of framework libraries (maven central, npm, chocolatey ….). Add to this the growth in multi-cloud and emphasis on micro deployments to support microservices and the deployment landscape gets larger and ever more complex and therefore vulnerable.

What to do?

Continue reading →

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Notifications from Oracle API Platform Cloud Service

11 Monday Nov 2019

Posted by mp3monster in API Platform CS, General, Oracle, Technology, tools

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

API, Cloud, CS, IDCS, Notifications, nudge, Oracle, Owasp, platform, slack, utility

There are circumstances in which notifications from the Oracle API Platform CS could be seen as desirable.  For example, if you wish to ensure that the developers are defining good APIs and not accidentally implementing APIs that hit the OWASP Top 10 for APIs. Then you will probably configure things such that developer users can design the APIs, configure the policies, but only request an API to be deployed.

However, presently notifications through mechanisms such as email or via collaboration platforms such as Slack aren’t available.  But implementing a solution isn’t difficult.  For the rest of this blog we’ll explore how this might be implemented, complete with a Slack implementation.

Continue reading →

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API Security

01 Saturday Jun 2019

Posted by mp3monster in API Platform CS, APIs & microservices, General, Oracle, Technology

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API, API Platform, api Security.io, Owasp, pen testing, SANS, Security

I’ve started to subscribe to the APISecurity.io newsletter. The newsletter includes the analysis of recent API based security breaches along with other useful API related news. Some of the details of the breaches make for interesting reading and provide some good examples of what not to do. It is rather surprising how regularly the lack of the application of good practises is, including:

  • Checking the payload is valid to the definition,
  • Checking the payload size to ensure it is in the expected bounds,
  • Use strong typing on the content received it will help validate the content and limit the chances of poisonous content like injected SQL,
  • owaspEnsuring the API has mitigation’s against the classic OWASP Top 10 – SQL Injection, poor authentication implementation.

More broadly, we see that people will recognise the need for applying penetration testing, and look to external organisations to perform the testing, when such work is commissioned the understanding of what the pen tester does is not understood by those logocommissioning the tests (SANS paper of security scoping), therefore know whether all the risks are checked. When you add to that, the temptation to keep such costs down resulting in the service provider not necessarily probing your APIs to the fullest extent. Not all penetration test services are equal, so simply working to a budget isn’t wise, yes there is a need for pragmatism, but only when you understand the cost/risk trade-off.

But also remember application logic and API definitions and the security controls in place change over time as do the discovery of new vulnerabilities on the stack you’re using, along with evolving compliance requirements. All meaning that a penetration test at the initial go-live is not enough and should be an inherent part of an APIs lifecycle.

cloudgs_apimgrWhen it comes to payload checks etc, products like Oracle’s API Platform make it easy to realise or provide out of the box checks for factors such as size limits, implementing payload checks, so better to use them.

If you ever need to be reminded that of why best practises are needed and should be implemented; a mindset of when not if a breach will happen will ensure you’re prepared and the teams are motivated to put the good practises in.

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